The Supreme Court, CAFA, and \u3cem\u3eParens Patriae\u3c/em\u3e Actions: Will it be Principles or Biases? by Gifford, Donald G. & Reynolds, William L.
CITE AS 92 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 1 
 
 
THE SUPREME COURT, CAFA, AND PARENS 
PATRIAE ACTIONS: WILL IT BE PRINCIPLES OR 
BIASES?* 
DONALD G. GIFFORD** AND WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS*** 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1	  
I.    THE BURGEONING IMPORTANCE OF PARENS PATRIAE STANDING ...... 3	  
II.    HOOD V. AU OPTRONICS: THE CASE BELOW ...................................... 4	  
III.    COMPETING APPROACHES TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ........... 7	  
A.	   Textualism ................................................................................... 7	  
B.	   The Purposive Approach ............................................................. 9	  
IV.    INTERPRETING THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ........................... 9	  
A. 	   Textual Analysis .......................................................................... 9	  
1.  “Class Action” ........................................................................ 9	  
2.  “Mass Action” ...................................................................... 10	  
B.	   Implicit Purposivism Prevails (Surprisingly) in Hood ............. 13	  
C.	   Examining CAFA’s Purpose and Legislative History ............... 13	  
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 15	  
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari in Mississippi ex rel. 
Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.1 provides a unique opportunity to test whether 
the individual Justices will follow their previously articulated principles of 
statutory interpretation or instead will ignore these principles in order to 
reach a result reflecting their respective pro-business or pro-consumer 
biases. The issue before the Court in Hood is whether the defendant 
manufacturers can remove a parens patriae action2 alleging price-fixing 
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 1. 701 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2736 (2013). 
 2. Parens patriae, a Latin phrase, is roughly translated as “parent of the country.” Alfred L. 
Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982). It now describes a type of standing given 
to a state government to sue to protect the health and welfare of its citizens. Id. at 607; see also 
infra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
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brought by the State of Mississippi to federal court on diversity grounds 
under the provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”).3 
On one hand, Justices Scalia and Thomas are consistent proponents of 
a textualist or plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation.4 Usually 
their fellow conservatives on the Court, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Alito and Kennedy, follow their lead on issues of statutory interpretation.5 
At the same time, these five Justices all rank within the ten most pro-
business Justices (among thirty-six ranked Justices) since 1946, with 
Justice Alito ranking as the most pro-business Justice and Chief Justice 
Roberts coming in second.6 On the other hand, Justice Breyer is the 
strongest proponent now on the Court of a competing approach to statutory 
interpretation known here as the “purposive” approach,7 a method of 
interpretation that focuses on the purpose the legislature sought to achieve 
when it passed the law.8 Justice Breyer, along with Justices Ginsburg and 
Sotomayor, are also the Justices most likely to rule against corporations 
and in favor of plaintiffs such as consumers or employees.9 
So here lies the rub. An honest and logical application of textualism in 
Hood by Justice Scalia and his conservative colleagues will lead to a pro-
consumer outcome. On the other hand, a genuine application of the 
purposive approach by Justice Breyer will probably lead to a pro-business 
and anti-consumer outcome, although the outcome here is somewhat less 
predictable than it is for the conservatives.10 So for both the conservatives 
and the more progressive members of the Court, which shall it be? A 
 
 3. Hood, 701 F.3d 796; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006) (providing the requirements for a 
class action lawsuit and how the case can be removed). CAFA permits removal of a defined 
“class action” to federal court; it also permits removal of a defined “mass action” to federal court 
even if the latter is not a “class action.” Hood, 701 F. 3d at 799. Congress adopted CAFA in large 
part due to a fear that state courts had become too friendly to plaintiffs in mass tort actions. See 
Willy E. Rice, Allegedly “Biased ,” “Intimidating ,” and “Incompetent” State Court Judges and 
the Questionable Removal of State Law Class Actions to Purportedly “Impartial” and 
“Competent” Federal Courts, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 419, 427 (2012). 
 4. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An 
Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis , 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 250–51 tbl.2 (2010). 
 5. See id. 
 6. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the 
Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1450–51 tbl.7 (2013). 
 7. See infra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. See also Krishnakumar, supra note 4, at 
250–51 tbl.2. 
 8. Or to borrow the terminology used more than four centuries ago in Heydon’s Case, 76 
Eng. Rep. 637 (1584), what was the “mischief” that the legislation sought to cure? 
 9. All three rank in the bottom half of the Justices ranked in the review by Epstein and his 
colleagues. See Epstein et. al., supra note 6. Justice Kagan was not ranked by the authors because 
of the small number of business cases decided since her recent addition to the Court. 
 10. A major reason why CAFA was adopted was to get mass actions out of state court. See 
Rice, supra note 3. 
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principled application of their preferred approach to statutory 
interpretation? Or a result consistent with their ideological preferences? 
This Article first examines the increasing importance of parens 
patriae litigation and its relation to class actions. Next, it discusses the 
Hood decision along with conflicting decisions in other circuits. The 
Article then examines the competing methods of statutory interpretation, 
purposive and textualist, before concluding with an analysis of CAFA and 
the facts of Hood under each approach. 
I.  THE BURGEONING IMPORTANCE OF PARENS PATRIAE STANDING 
Courts have long recognized the standing of a state as parens patriae 
to sue for harms to its “quasi-sovereign” interest “in the well-being of its 
populace.”11 A state has the right to sue and protect such interests so long 
as the state itself is more than a nominal party and is able to articulate “an 
interest apart from the interests of particular private parties.”12 
At least since the mid-1990s, plaintiffs’ attorneys in mass actions 
involving many plaintiffs have sought to use parens patriae lawsuits—
actions which are both more exotic and less well understood than more 
traditional forms of mass actions, such as class actions—as a convenient 
way to circumvent inconvenient requirements of the law, requirements 
which would make mass litigation more demanding and often impossible. 
The pending Supreme Court case presents one example of such an issue. A 
parens patriae action is filed by the state attorney general, but often with 
the assistance of private plaintiffs’ counsel specializing in mass tort 
actions.13 Parens patriae actions, like class actions, seek recovery for 
aggregated individual harms in a collective action. Will the use of parens 
patriae standing by mass plaintiffs’ attorneys, in cooperation with the state 
attorney general, enable them to avoid the removal provisions of CAFA? 
Another example occurs when mass torts attorneys couple the state’s 
standing as parens patriae with substantive claims, such as public 
nuisance, that regard the harm as a collective one in order to circumvent the 
traditional tort causation requirement that the plaintiff prove that her harm 
is caused by a particular defendant.14 
 
 11. Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982). 
 12. Id. at 607. 
 13. See Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys General and 
Parens Patriae Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. REV. 913, 964–65 (2008) [hereinafter 
Impersonating the Legislature] (describing typical collaboration between state attorneys general 
and private counsel). 
 14. See DONALD G. GIFFORD, SUING THE TOBACCO AND LEAD PIGMENT INDUSTRIES 5 
(2010) (describing tobacco and childhood lead poisoning as examples). For instance, consider 
Rhode Island’s lawsuit against lead pigment manufacturers seeking the costs of abating a public 
nuisance consisting of the presence of lead-based paint on the walls of hundreds of thousands of 
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Because of the role now played by parens patriae litigation in 
circumventing the obstacles to class actions—the more traditional form of 
mass actions—it should come as no surprise that mass litigation plaintiffs’ 
attorneys often partner with state attorneys general in initiating and trying 
parens patriae litigation.15 Plaintiffs’ attorneys heavily lobby state 
attorneys general to file these actions, both in the several state capitals and 
at nationwide gatherings of attorneys general.16 In the current round of 
federal cases in which states claim that CAFA does not apply to parens 
patriae actions, private plaintiffs’ firms, usually with extensive mass 
litigation experience, generally act as co-counsel with the attorney 
general.17 
II.  HOOD V. AU OPTRONICS: THE CASE BELOW 
In Hood, the Mississippi Attorney General sued manufacturers and 
distributors of LCD panels, asserting they had engaged in price-fixing.18 
The lawsuit alleged violations of two state statutes and requested various 
remedies including injunctive relief, statutory civil penalties, and restitution 
for the harms suffered by state residents. The defendants removed the 
action to federal court under CAFA on the grounds that the state’s action 
was either a “class action” or a “mass action” as defined by the statute. 
However, the federal district court remanded the case to state court, finding 
that the action was a state parens patriae action, designed to protect the 
state’s “quasi-sovereign interest” in its economy and its citizens’ economic 
well-being, and that the suit was neither a “class action” nor a “mass 
 
houses throughout the state that cause childhood lead poisoning. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 
951 A.2d 428 (R.I. 2008) (holding that public nuisance claims do not afford a cause of action 
against lead pigment manufacturers). Because of the fungible nature of lead pigment, individual 
homeowners would be unsuccessful if they sued the manufacturers, because each one would be 
unable to identify the specific manufacturer that produced the pigment covering the walls of her 
particular house. See GIFFORD, supra, at 124. However, in Lead Industrial Ass’n, the state sued to 
collect the costs of abating the lead-based paint hazards in all older houses containing lead 
pigment throughout the state. The lawsuit, combining the state’s standing as parens patriae with 
the collective tort of nuisance, unsuccessfully sought to circumvent the requirement of an 
individualized causal connection between tortfeasor and victim. The Rhode Island Supreme Court 
reversed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the state and held that the requirements of public 
nuisance had not been established, thereby preventing the state’s attempt to use its standing as 
parens patriae to get around the inability to prove causation. See Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 
452–53. 
 15. GIFFORD, supra note 14, at 210–13. 
 16. See Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature , supra note 13, at 964–65, 967. 
 17. See, e.g., AU Optronics Corp. v. South Carolina, 699 F.3d 385, 385 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(listing the Attorney General of South Carolina and private attorneys as co-counsel). 
 18. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 701 F.3d 796, 797 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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action.”19 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded 
the case back to the federal district court.20 
Whether parens patriae actions may be heard in the federal courts 
turns on the interpretation of several provisions of CAFA. First, do such 
actions qualify as either “class actions” or “mass actions”? The Fifth 
Circuit “quickly” agreed with all other circuits that parens patriae actions 
are not class actions.21 CAFA defines a class action as “any civil action 
filed under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or a similar 
State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be 
brought by [one] or more representative persons as a class action.”22 The 
court noted that the state did not bring the lawsuit as a class action and, in 
fact, Mississippi law “explicitly prohibits class actions” both generally,23 
and specifically in the context of the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act. 
Violations of the latter constituted one of the Attorney General’s claims.24 
The Fifth Circuit stated that the more difficult question was whether 
the state action constituted a “mass action,”25 defined by CAFA as “any 
civil action” involving the “claims of 100 or more persons” that are to be 
tried jointly.26 The Fifth Circuit held that the parens patriae action was a 
mass action because the state sought to recover for both general harm on 
behalf of the state and individual harms suffered by its residents; therefore, 
both the state and its residents (more than 100 of whom were plaintiffs) 
were real parties in interest.27 
The Fifth Circuit’s holding in Hood conflicts with the holding of every 
other federal circuit court of appeals that has addressed the issue.28 The 
 
 19. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 876 F. Supp. 2d 758, 774–75 (S.D. 
Miss. 2012). 
 20. Hood, 701 F.3d at 803. 
 21. Id. at 799; See, e.g., AU Optronics Corp. v. South Carolina, 699 F.3d 385, 394 (4th Cir. 
2012) (holding that South Carolina is the “real party in interest” and CAFA’s diversity 
requirement is not met); LG Display Co., Ltd. v. Madigan, 665 F.3d 768, 774 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that a parens patriae claim “is not a class action or mass action under CAFA”); 
Washington v. Chimei Innolux Corp., 659 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[P]arens patriae suits 
filed by state Attorneys General may not be removed to federal court because the suits are not 
‘class actions’ within the plain meaning of CAFA.”). 
 22. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (2006). 
 23. Hood, 701 F.3d at 799 (citing Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Booth, 830 So. 2d 1205, 
1214 (Miss. 2002)). 
 24. Id. (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-15(4) (2009)). 
 25. Id. 
 26. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). 
 27. Hood, 701 F.3d at 801. 
 28. See, e.g., Nevada v. Bank of America, 672 F.3d 661, 672 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that a 
parens patriae suit is not a “mass action” under CAFA); AU Optronics Corp. v. South Carolina, 
699 F.3d 385, 394 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that a parens patriae suit is not removable as either a 
“class action” or a “mass action” under CAFA); LG Display Co., Ltd. v. Madigan, 665 F.3d 768, 
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Fourth Circuit, for example, in an action against many of the same 
defendants as those in Hood, reasoned, 
The State, in these parens patriae actions, is enforcing its own 
statutes in seeking to protect its citizens against price-fixing 
conspiracies. That the statutes authorizing these actions in the name 
of the State also permit a court to award restitution to injured citizens 
is incidental to the State’s overriding interests and to the substance of 
these proceedings. Those citizens are not named plaintiffs here, and 
they need not be considered in the diversity analysis of the State’s 
claims.29 
The Fourth Circuit held, therefore, that “a claim for restitution, when 
tacked onto other claims being properly pursued by the State, alters neither 
the State’s quasi-sovereign interest in enforcing its own laws nor the nature 
and effect of the proceedings.”30  
The Fifth Circuit rejected that position, however. In the concluding 
section of its Hood opinion, the Fifth Circuit perhaps more openly revealed 
what lay behind its holding: 
At its core, this case practically can be characterized as a kind of 
class action in which the State of Mississippi is the class 
representative. By proceeding the way it has, the plaintiff class and 
its attorneys seek to avoid the rigors associated with class actions 
(and avoid removal to federal court).31 
In other words, although the court admitted that it cannot fit the state’s 
parens patriae action within the “plain meaning” of the words “class 
action,” the court was nonetheless confident that parens patriae actions 
should be removable under the statute. Interpreting “mass action” to 
include parens patriae actions, after all, furthered the purposes of CAFA 
by encompassing novel forms of litigation that seem designed to 
circumvent its provisions. 
Finally, the Fifth Circuit construed CAFA’s “general public” 
exception to lawsuits otherwise qualifying as “mass actions.”32 The 
exception provides that a suit is not a “mass action” and therefore not 
removable, if “all of the claims in the action are asserted on behalf of the 
general public (and not on behalf of individual claimants or members of a 
purported class) pursuant to a State statute specifically authorizing such 
 
772 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding same); Washington v. Chimei Innolux Corp., 659 F.3d 842, 847 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (holding that a parens patriae suit is not a “class action”). 
 29. AU Optronics Corp., 699 F.3d at 394. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Hood, 701 F.3d at 803. 
 32. Id. at 802. 
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action.”33 Because the court construed the possibility of restitution to 
harmed consumers within the state as “claims” for these ultimate 
beneficiaries, it concluded that “there is no way that ‘all of the claims’ are 
‘asserted on behalf of the general public.’ ”34 
III.  COMPETING APPROACHES TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
When the Supreme Court considers the statutory interpretation 
problem posed by Hood, each Justice will employ one of two contrasting 
approaches to statutory interpretation: either “textualism” (often referred to 
as the “plain meaning rule”) or the “purposive” approach. Under a 
textualist approach, the meaning of a statute can be revealed through a 
simple examination of the statutory language itself.35 Textualism is most 
often associated with the more conservative Justices. As Judge Posner 
noted extrajudicially, 
It is not an accident that most “loose constructionists” are political 
liberals and most “strict constructionists” are political conservatives. 
The former think that modern legislation does not go far enough, the 
latter that it goes too far. Each school has developed interpretive 
techniques appropriate to its political ends.36 
In contrast, Justice Breyer and other more liberal Justices often seek to 
interpret the statutory text in a manner consistent with the purpose of the 
legislation.37 To uncover Congressional goals in passing the legislation, 
liberal Justices look beyond the text to legislative history.38 
A.  Textualism 
In their recent book, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 
Justice Scalia and his co-author Bryan Garner endorse a variant of 
textualism that they call “fair reading,” which emphasizes “determining the 
application of a governing text to given facts on the basis of how a 
reasonable reader . . . would have understood the text at the time it was 
 
 33. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III) (2006). 
 34. Hood, 701 F.3d at 802 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III)). 
 35. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 46:1 (7th ed. 2007). 
 36. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 
U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 822 (1983). 
 37. Kenneth R. Dortzbach, Legislative History: The Philosophies of Justices Scalia and 
Breyer and the Use of Legislative History by the Wisconsin State Courts, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 161, 
169 (1996). 
 38. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative 
History: Principle , Strategy , and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 120 & 
n.6 (2008); David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use 
of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1659 (2010). 
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issued.”39 They flatly assert that it is a “false notion that the spirit of the 
statute should prevail over its letter.”40 They admit that the “purpose of the 
text” is relevant to the interpretative enterprise but argue that purpose must 
be gleaned from the text itself and “not from extrinsic sources such as 
legislative history or an assumption about the legal drafter’s desires.”41 
Textualists claim that their approach furthers the democratic process. 
Unlike legislative history, which is not law, the statutory text becomes law 
through the proper constitutional processes. According to textualists, 
therefore, the only instrument entitled to constitutional deference is the 
actual statutory language. The text, according to Justice Scalia, is the only 
true unified voice of Congress because 
[c]ommittee reports, floor speeches, and even colloquies between 
Congressmen are frail substitutes for bicameral vote upon the text of 
a law and its presentment to the President. It is at best dangerous to 
assume that all the necessary participants in the law-enactment 
process are acting upon the same unexpressed assumptions.42 
Finally, textualists assert that the use of legislative history promotes 
unbridled judicial subjectivity.43 As law and economics scholar Judge 
Easterbrook once warned, the expansive legislative record allows a “court 
[to] manipulate the meaning of a law by choosing which snippets to 
emphasize . . . .”44 
Consistent with this textualist approach, one of the canons of 
construction endorsed by Justice Scalia is that “[n]othing is to be added to 
what the text states or reasonably implies (casus omissus pro omisso 
habendus est).”45 The judge is not to fill in gaps or speculate as to what the 
legislature would have wanted or what it would have done if it had thought 
about the issue requiring the interpretation of the statute.46 
 
 39. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 33 (2012). 
 40. Id. at 343. 
 41. Id. at 56. 
 42. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191–92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation 
omitted). 
 43. See Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The 
Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1885 (1998). 
 44. Matter of Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989). Perhaps the most notorious use 
of textualism in recent years is Justice Scalia’s opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570 (2008), in which he used extended textual analysis, including contemporary usages, to hold a 
law unconstitutional. Before the recent revival of textualism, perhaps its most famous use was 
Justice Black’s dissenting opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364–74 (1967) (using 
textual analysis to argue that the Fourth Amendment does not protect against wiretapping because 
the Framers were only concerned with “tangible” searches and seizures). 
 45. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 39, at 93 (emphasis added). 
 46. Id. at 95, 349. 
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B. The Purposive Approach 
On the opposite side of the interpretive spectrum are the liberal 
Justices, led by Justice Breyer, who advocate an approach to statutory 
interpretation that focuses on the legislature’s purpose in adopting the 
legislation. In 1992, while serving as the Chief Judge of the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit, Justice Breyer published his well-known law 
review article entitled On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting 
Statutes,47 in which he promoted the use of legislative history as an aid to 
uncovering congressional purpose. Justice Breyer asserted that “[a] court 
often needs to know the purpose a particular statutory word or phrase 
serves within the broader context of a statutory scheme in order to decide 
properly whether a particular circumstance falls within the scope of that 
word or phrase.”48 Thus, Breyer and the other purposivists consider 
extrinsic sources useful in ascertaining legislative purpose, a key 
consideration to them when interpreting a statute. 
IV.  INTERPRETING THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT 
Hood lays out the basic analysis under CAFA which permits removal 
of either a “class action” or a “mass action” to federal court. In addition, as 
stated previously, a “mass action” cannot be removed under CAFA if it 
falls within the “general public exception.” This Part explores those terms 
in the context of the facts of Hood. It does so by looking at the problem 
from both a textualist and purposivist approach. 
A.  Textual Analysis 
1.  “Class Action” 
Each of the federal courts of appeals that has considered whether a 
parens patriae action qualifies for removal to the federal courts because it 
is a “class action” has agreed that it does not qualify.49 Most of these courts 
explicitly used the plain meaning rule to reach this result.50 For example, in 
Purdue Pharma , L.P. v. Kentucky ,51 the Second Circuit concluded that a 
“parens patriae action is not a ‘class action’ within the plain meaning of 
CAFA,” thus ending the inquiry.52 The court noted that the statutes under 
which the attorney general proceeded neither authorized suit “as a class 
 
 47. 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992). 
 48. Id. at 853. 
 49. See supra note 21. 
 50. See id. 
 51. 704 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 52. Id. at 220. 
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action” nor shared “any of the familiar hallmarks of Rule 23 class 
actions.”53 The court quoted from an earlier federal district court opinion: 
Congress chose to define ‘class action’ not in terms of joinder of 
individual claims or by representative relief in general, but in terms 
of the statute or rule the case is filed under . . . . If this is a 
formalistic outcome, it is a formalism dictated by Congress.54 
As previously mentioned, even the Fifth Circuit in Hood held that a parens 
patriae action does not satisfy CAFA’s definition of a class action, and in 
doing so, it relied largely on a textual analysis.55 
2.  “Mass Action” 
The various federal courts of appeals also purport to use a textual 
approach in interpreting the CAFA provision defining “mass action.”56 
However, while the other courts interpreting the provision concluded that a 
parens patriae action is not a “mass action,”57 the Fifth Circuit reached the 
opposite result in Hood.58 Apparently the “plain meaning” lies in the eyes 
of the beholder. 
If an action qualifies as a “mass action,” it can be removed to the 
federal courts provided that the other requirements of CAFA are met.59 The 
issue then becomes whether a parens patriae action that requests restitution 
for members of the general public, along with other remedies, satisfies the 
first portion of the definition of a “mass action” as “any civil action . . . in 
which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons” are involved.60 In 
other words, does such a parens patriae action comprise a single claim on 
behalf of the state, or many claims, including the claims of state residents 
on whose behalf the state seeks restitution?  
Most courts understand this dispute as a choice between viewing the 
parens patriae litigation under a “claim-by-claim” approach or under a 
“whole-case” approach. Under the former approach, each consumer whose 
losses underlie the state’s action seeking restitution is seen as a real party in 
 
 53. Id. at 216. 
 54. Id. (quoting In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 2d 654, 664 (E.D. La. 2012)). 
 55. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 701 F.3d 796, 799 (5th Cir. 2012). The 
court stated that whether the parens patriae action qualified as a class action “can be answered 
quickly in the negative,” because the state did not file the action under Rule 23 of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure or a similar procedural rule. Id. Further, reported the court, “Mississippi state law 
explicitly prohibits class actions . . . .” Id.  
 56. See, e.g., LG Display Co., Ltd. v. Madigan, 665 F.3d 768, 773 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 57. See, e.g., id. at 772; Nevada v. Bank of America, 672 F.3d 661, 672 (9th Cir. 2012), AU 
Optronics Corp. v. South Carolina, 699 F.3d 385, 391 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 58. Hood , 701 F.3d at 802. 
 59. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(A) (2006). 
 60. Id. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). 
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interest and therefore possesses a separate “claim.”61 Under the “whole-
case” approach, the complaint is viewed in its entirety and the claim 
belongs only to the state.62 
Regardless of whether the courts of appeals other than the Fifth 
Circuit have followed a “claim-by-claim” or a “whole-case” approach, they 
have employed an essentially textual analysis when interpreting the “mass 
action” provision. The Fourth Circuit’s opinion in AU Optronics Corp. v. 
South Carolina63 provides an example of the “whole-case” approach: 
South Carolina is the real party in interest, a fact that is 
unencumbered by the restitution claims. . . . [A] claim for restitution, 
when tacked onto other claims being properly pursued by the State, 
alters neither the State’s quasi-sovereign interest in enforcing its own 
laws, nor the nature and effect of the proceedings. . . . Those citizens 
are not named plaintiffs here, and they need not be considered in the 
diversity analysis of the State’s claims.64 
In Nevada v. Bank of America Corp,65 the Ninth Circuit reached a 
similar result by categorizing the restitutionary payments to the state’s 
citizens as “fundamentally law enforcement actions designed to protect the 
public.”66 
The whole-case approach appears to be correct under textualism. 
Justice Scalia and Garner admonish courts to give statutory words their 
ordinary meaning67 and advise that dictionaries be used in interpreting 
language.68 Black’s Law Dictionary defines a claim as “[t]he assertion of an 
existing right . . . .”69 It is the state, acting through its attorney general, that 
asserts its rights in a parens patriae action. Injured consumers ultimately 
may benefit, but they never assert claims. 
Furthermore, what does the “general public” exception to the “mass 
action” definition suggest about interpreting “mass action”? In LG Display 
Co. , Ltd. v. Madigan,70 the Seventh Circuit held that a parens patriae 
 
 61. See AU Optronics, 699 F.3d at 392 (discussing the “claim-by-claim” approach used in 
Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 429–30 (5th Cir. 2008)). 
 62. See, e.g., AU Optronics, 699 F.3d at 392 (discussing the “whole-case” approach used in 
Bank of America, 672 F.3d at 670). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 394; see, e.g., Bank of America, 672 F.3d at 672; LG Display Co., Ltd. v. Madigan, 
665 F.3d 768, 772 (7th Cir. 2011).  
 65. 672 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 66. Id. at 671 (citation omitted). 
 67. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 39, at 69. 
 68. Id. at 70. 
 69. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 281 (Bryan A. Garner ed.) (9th ed. 2009); see also 
BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (William S. Anderson ed.) (3d ed. 1969) (defining “claim” as 
“a demand for money . . . ; the assertion of a demand . . .”). 
 70. 665 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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action presents a single claim on behalf of the state.71 The court reasoned 
that the “general public” exception buttressed its conclusion because that 
provision provides that the case does not qualify as a mass action if all the 
attorney general’s claims are asserted on behalf of the general public. To 
the court, this was a straightforward application of the “plain language of 
that provision.”72 
In contrast, both the majority and concurring opinions in Hood twisted 
themselves into knots applying the general public exception in very 
different ways to the mass action definition. The Hood majority began its 
reasoning by positing that a court errs when it takes a “whole-case” 
approach and determines that “the case is not a mass action because the 
State is the sole party in interest.”73 Under this approach, continued the 
majority, the general public exception necessarily applies to all mass 
actions.74 However, the court then cited the textualist “surplusage canon” 
for the proposition that statutes presumptively are to be construed in a way 
that gives effect to each provision and does not render it mere surplusage.75 
The majority argued that if a parens patriae action does not qualify as a 
“mass action” the general public exception would have no effect. 76 
Therefore, the court concluded that the only way to avoid this undesirable 
result is to view parens patriae actions from a “claim-by-claim” approach 
and to hold that they do qualify in the first instance as mass actions, thus 
giving effect to the “general public” exception.77 However, the majority 
then ultimately decided that the general public exception did not apply in 
Hood because under its “claim-by-claim” approach there were more than 
one-hundred individual claims, and the requirement that all of the claims be 
asserted on behalf of the general public was not met.78 
What the court obviously missed in its application of the surplusage 
canon is that not all “mass actions” are ones involving the state as parens 
patriae. The term “mass action” typically refers to the consolidation of 
numerous claims brought by private parties or sometimes claims filed by 
both the attorney general and private parties.79 Most often in such mass 
actions, the “general public” exception would not apply. However, it would 
 
 71. Id. at 772. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 701 F.3d 796, 802 n.1 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 802 (citing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 39, at 174). 
 76. Id. at 802. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 802–03. 
 79. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-144, at 93–94 (2003) (reporting CAFA legislative history 
describing mass joinder proceedings in Mississippi and West Virginia state courts that 
consolidated as many as 8,000 individual actions on behalf of private parties). 
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apply in a few instances. Examples include situations when all the private 
parties sue as “private attorneys general” under state or federal statutes,80 or 
when both the attorney general and private individuals who sustained 
special damages sue to abate a public nuisance.81 In those cases, therefore, 
the general public exception would not be redundant. Because the provision 
is redundant only in a subset of cases, the surplusage canon does not apply 
and has no role in construing the statutory provision defining “mass 
action.” 
B. Implicit Purposivism Prevails (Surprisingly) in Hood 
In reaching a conclusion contrary to that of the other circuits, the Fifth 
Circuit held in Hood that a parens patriae action that includes requests for 
restitution on behalf of state residents who have been harmed involves the 
separate claims of “100 or more persons,” and, therefore, CAFA allows 
removal of such a “mass action” to federal court.82 The opinion provides 
little textual analysis—the court does not appear to rely on a textual 
analysis of the word “claim.” 
Instead, the court’s analysis implicitly evinces a purposive approach to 
statutory interpretation. Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Congress 
intended CAFA to permit removal of any actions that involve aggregated 
damages allegedly suffered by more than 100 persons, even if the lawsuit 
does not appear to meet the textual definition of either “class action” or 
“mass action.” The court held that “Mississippi is acting, not in its parens 
patriae capacity, but essentially as a class representative.”83 Remember that 
the court itself found that the lawsuit was not a class action.84 The proper 
role of the court, according to the Fifth Circuit, is “to pierce the pleadings 
and look at the real nature of a state’s claims.”85 Accordingly, it applied the 
statutory definition to parens patriae actions in a manner that it evidently 
believed would accomplish the congressional purpose. 
C. Examining CAFA’s Purpose and Legislative History 
While textualists regard the use of purpose evinced within the text as 
appropriate to construing statutory provisions,86 they consider legislative 
 
 80. See Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 589, 590, 599–607 (2005) (describing private attorney general statutes).  
 81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (1979) (allowing both attorneys general 
and individuals sustaining special damages to sue to abate public nuisances). 
 82. Hood, 701 F.3d at 804. 
 83. Id. at 801. 
 84. See supra text accompanying notes 21–24. 
 85. Hood , 701 F.3d at 799. 
 86. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 39, at 20. 
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history to be an entirely inappropriate vehicle for determining statutory 
intent.87 For purposivists, on the other hand, legislative history is a key tool 
in construing a statute.88 
As Justice Scalia points out, deciding how broadly to interpret 
legislative purpose is often outcome determinative. Purposivists, he 
contends, “purport to give effect to what the legislature desired—the 
broader purpose it had in mind . . . .”89 Textualists, on the other hand, 
believe that “purpose must be defined precisely” and “as concretely as 
possible.”90 
If Justice Breyer employs a purposive approach in Hood, he will 
examine CAFA’s broad-based purposes as revealed in its legislative 
history. The Senate Committee Report notes that CAFA “is to be 
interpreted liberally. . . . Generally speaking, lawsuits that resemble a 
purported class action should be considered class actions for the purpose of 
applying these provisions.”91 According to the legislative history, the 
primary goals of Congress in enacting CAFA included protecting corporate 
defendants from plaintiffs’ lawyers.92 A purposivist would argue that the 
statute should be construed in a manner that makes it impossible for 
attorneys making mass claims to thwart CAFA by partnering with state 
attorneys general in the prosecution of parens patriae actions. The 
complaint in the Hood litigation is a “carbon copy” of complaints filed in 
other courts in class actions against the same defendants.93 Purposivists 
would find, as did the Fifth Circuit in Hood,94 that the action is precisely 
the type of litigation against many defendants, with worldwide implications 
but with little connection to Mississippi, which CAFA anticipated should 
be heard in the federal courts.95 
In fact, it turns out that there is legislative history on the specific issue 
of whether CAFA was intended to cover parens patriae actions. During its 
consideration of CAFA, the Senate considered an amendment that would 
have explicitly provided that the term “class action” does “not include any 
 
 87. Id. at 56–57. 
 88. Breyer, supra note 47, at 853–60. 
 89. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 39, at 22. 
 90. Id. at 56–57. 
 91. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 35 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 34. It should be 
noted that the Senate committee report was not issued until after CAFA was enacted, so some 
courts have given it very little weight. See, e.g. , Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno , 472 F.3d 53, 58 (2d 
Cir. 2006). 
 92. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4–5. 
 93. Brief for Respondents at 8, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. 
AU Optronics, Inc., ___ U.S.____ (2013) (No. 12-1036), 2013 WL 1770862, at *8. 
 94. See supra text accompanying notes 28 and 83–85. 
 95. Brief for Respondents , supra note 93, at 7. 
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civil action brought by, or on behalf of, any attorney general.”96 The bill 
sponsors opposed the amendment, stating that it was “unnecessary” 
because “parens patriae cases . . . are not class actions.”97 Although a 
textualist would observe that this specific legislative history is ambiguous 
and can be interpreted in contradictory ways, the most plausible reading of 
that history suggests that the act does not apply to parens patriae actions. 
Therefore, whether Justice Breyer and his colleagues following a purposive 
approach decide that CAFA covers parens patriae actions will depend on 
whether they focus on the broad-based remedial approach of the statute, as 
their own approach suggests they should; or whether they focus on the 
specific legislative history regarding parens patriae litigation under CAFA 
which can be interpreted with some difficulty to reach a contrary result. 
The former choice will favor business, which prefers mass tort cases to be 
heard in federal court;98 the latter will not. That is the temptation that the 
purposivists will face: Stay true to your principles and what you regard as 
an undesirable result, or jettison your principles and reach a result that you 
like. 
Justice Scalia and the other textualists face a starker dilemma. Because 
textualism leads to what they regard as an undesirable, anti-business result, 
will they yield to temptation and examine specific portions of the 
legislative history recited above that can be read to fit parens patriae 
actions within CAFA’s removal provisions?99 
CONCLUSION 
If Justice Scalia and his conservative colleagues apply a textual 
approach in Hood in a principled way, in keeping with the model employed 
by the Fourth, Ninth, and other circuits, it will result in a decision that 
business interests will not like. Conversely, if Justice Breyer leads his more 
progressive colleagues on the Court in a purposive approach to statutory 
interpretation, their opinion possibly, but with less certainty, will hold that 
the case should be removed to the federal courts, a result that business 
interests will cheer. 
Hood is not an anomaly. In the typical case, following textualist 
principles likely will yield a result that parallels Justice Scalia’s 
predisposition in favor of limited government because most statutes 
regulate private conduct. CAFA, however, does not regulate private 
business, but instead restricts state courts that in turn regulate private 
 
 96. 151 CONG. REC. 1,865 (2005).  
 97. Id. at 1,811 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
 98. See supra note 3. 
 99. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 40, at 388. 
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businesses through judicial action. As a result, textualism in Hood leads to 
a pro-regulatory and anti-business result. Thus, the pending case promises 
an unusual test of whether the Justices will follow their own preferred 
principles of statutory interpretation or their pro- or anti- business biases. 
